So if the republicans even mention the word filibuster then we should give up?

This question was asked me recently by a good friend. I will now attempt to answer it, and in the process I will make what I think are some very important points relevant to ALL Progressives and Democrats.

A filibuster effectively stops ALL debate on a bill until 60 votes are garnered to break the filibuster. You accuse Democrats of "giving up," but I'm not sure what it is that you think Democrats can do. Take Climate Change Legislation, for example. Republicans have filibustered any realistic form of Climate Change Legislation. What is it that you think Democrats should do about that? I'm very curious to hear your thoughts on this. Tell me what you think Democrats should do and I will evaluate whether or not those actions are feasible and/or would be even slightly effective.

The Health Care Legislation recently passed is another interesting thing to look at. The ideal legislation would have been single-payer, but instead we passed what we shall term "ObamaCare." I assume you would have preferred single-payer to ObamaCare. As would I. But what would have happened if Democrats had proposed single-payer? Well, obviously it would have been filibustered to hell. But . . .what if there were no filibuster? It still would not pass. In order to examine why single-payer could never pass through the Senate, we must look at the make-up of the Democratic Caucus.

Right now there are 60 Senators who caucus with the Democrats. Sounds good, right? Wrong. Take a look at this list of 16 "moderate" Democrats. These are 16 Senators who caucus with the Democrats, but consistently vote against the type of legislation which you and I would like to see enacted. Any Single-Payer legislation would have been rejected by at least 11 of these "moderate" Democrats, leaving less than 50 votes. Single-payer, the only alternative to Obamacare, was/is-currently un-passable. The same goes for the public option, though that one is a little more tricky. If there had been no threat of filibuster, Democrats might have had more success in pressuring 11 of those Moderate Democrats to vote for a bill that included a public option. However, since there were 40 Republicans and a Lieberman who upheld the filibuster, we will never know. My personal opinion is that at least 11 Moderate Democrats would have voted against any bill with a public option. This same analysis applies to pretty much any of the good progressive legislation which you and I want to see passed.

Optics: The funny thing about the previous analysis is what it says about optics. Optics are very important in politics. For example, the optics of Obama's tax compromise make it look like President Obama is a weakling who acquiesced to Republican demands for tax-cuts for the wealthy. Those optics are bad (IMHO the risk of a double-dip recession outweighs the risk of bad optics in that specific situation). I just wanted to introduce the concept of optics here for a second because it is necessary in order for us to understand what I am about to talk about next.

Democratic Senate Electoral Strategy: We are going to talk about this in two subpoints.

A: The system of the Senate automatically presents problems for Democrats. As you know, there are 2 Senators from every state and they are elected by a plurality of voters in each state. This is as opposed to the House, where more populous states have many many more representatives. California, for example, has 53 representatives. This means that, in the House, California has about 26 times more representation than Idaho (as it should, at the very least). Of course, per capita, Idaho's representation in the House is quite a bit more than California's. And when you look at Idaho's representation in the Senate as compared to California's the disparity is STAGGERING. So, already you can see that rural states with lower populations have a massive advantage in the Senate. Of course, rural states have a very strong tendency to vote Republican. In those states, the will of the folks in more urban parts of the states are thwarted by the large amount of folks in more rural parts of the States. In Idaho, for example, Ada County always votes Democrat for Senate, but it does not matter because the rural parts of the state always vote Republican. If the Senate looked more like the House, we would have passed mounds of progressive legislation by now. Simply put, the House is more Democratic than the Senate. The Senate, really, is an unfair handicap for rural (Republican) America.

B: So, we can see that the Senate system is inherently stacked against the Democrats. What should the Democrats do? Well, this is a very interesting question. The strategy that the Democrats have fairly consistently followed for the past few decades is to run "moderate" Senate candidates in the Republican-leaning states where they think they actually have a chance of winning. In Idaho, this is not even an option. In Idaho it really does not matter who Democrats run for Senate if the candidate has a (D) next to their name. But look at Missouri, a Republican-leaning state that has a Democratic Senator. McCaskill joined the Senate in 2006 after a very tough election (about 49-47). It is a fact that a more progressive candidate would not have won that race. This is true of many conservative Senate Democrats. McCaskill is one of those who would likely have voted against any bill with a public option. If she had, she would certainly be voted out of office in her next election (she probably will anyway, but I'll get to that in a bit). It is equally true, though, that conservative Senate Democrats like McCaskill actually do personally oppose progressive legislation. Missouri Democrats nominated her for that very reason. They wanted a candidate who honestly appealed to Missouri voters because they knew that anything less would have much more likely resulted in a Republican Senator from Missouri. There was a similar case here in Idaho. Idaho Dems nominated Walt Minnick because they thought he was the only guy who could beat the embattled and relatively weak Bill Sali (mind you, he did so by a very very thin margin). This pattern has been carried out in Republican-leaning Senate races all throughout the country.

Back to optics: I have not offered any solutions yet, because I need to get back to the implications of the Democrats Senate electoral strategy regarding optics. Prima Facie, The Democrats Senate electoral strategy is not a completely incomprehensible strategy. It is a numbers strategy. This strategy would seem to make sense considering it is numbers which is required to pass legislation. However, it would appear that this strategy has backfired. Democrats do have numbers, but they have accomplished this by watering down their Senatorial Legislative capabilities dramatically. They have 60 Senators in their caucus, but cannot pass any meaningful legislation because 16 Senators within that caucus will oppose. This has three dramatic effects on optics.

A: First of all, if the Democrats are in power and they do not pass any progressive legislation, it looks to the American people as though the Democrats are either a) being sissies, or b) don't actually believe in their own ideas. Neither of these situations are the case, of course. Democrats can't pass progressive legislation because they simply don't have the numbers to do so. Americans don't pay enough attention to realize that this is a result of moderate democrats and that the un-Democratic nature of the Senate has a lot to do with the election of moderate Democrats. To these Americans, the Democrats look simply weak, ineffectual, and maybe even. These optics greatly angers the voters who voted for change.

B: Second. Imagine that the Democrats were somehow able to break a filibuster on a piece of real progressive legislation, and that the legislation were subject to an up-or-down vote. In terms of optics, what does it look like to the American people when the Democrats can't even get their own caucus to pass their own progressive legislation? Imagine if there were no filibuster and Democrats had pushed for single-payer health care. Well, the national debate would be centered around Obama trying to get those 16 moderate Democrats to vote for the legislation. That would be very bad optics, because it would result in Americans perceptions of Progressive Democrats as super hardcore left. The line of thought would go like this: If "Moderate Democrats" oppose progressive legislation, then that progressive legislation must be really really really hardcore leftist socialist. This is a result of electing Democrats to the Senate who don't support Progressive ideas.

C: So, let's focus now on Democrats recent legislative strategy. They knew they could not pass any really meaningful progressive legislation because it would be filibustered by Republicans and/or defeated by Republians and Moderate Democrats within their own caucus. They had TWO options. They could pass no legislation OR they could pass moderately progressive legislation. They went with option two. They passed Health Care. Now, the HCR bill is actually a very good bill. It provides insurance subsidies to any individual or family making less than 3X the poverty line, it ends recision, it ends denial-of-coverage based upon pre-existing conditions, it sets up a National HealthCare exchange, it allows people to stay on their parents health insurance until age 26. . .I could go on. At the same time, there are negative aspects. It doesn't do as much to control costs as we would like, it has a somewhat unsavory individual mandate, and it reinforces a health care system which is inherently flawed. However, compared with doing nothing, it is really good legislation. The unfortunate problem with this strategy is that the optics of it make Americans think that ObamaCare was the Democrats preferred legislation, when it most certainly was not. It highly upsets all the voters who voted for change because it is milquetoast in comparison to the change that they really wanted. Consider the financial regulation bill that passed. Objectively, it was good legislation. However, it didn't go far enough because it didn't end TooBigTooFail (ending TooBigTooFail, of course, could not have made it through the Senate). As a result, it looks to the American people as though the Democrats do not support TooBigTooFail. The truth, of course, is that liberal Democrats overwhelmingly support ending TooBigTooFail. In the end, Democrats were not even able to make a strong, unified, cogent argument for ending TooBigTooFail, mostly because of the optics involved in pushing for it while Republicans and Moderate Democrats push back. Additionally, when that legislation failed (as it no doubt would), Democrats would once again look weak and ineffectual while Republicans and Moderate Democrats would look strong for stopping legislation. Why stick your neck out for something that will only fail anyway, when that something's failure will weaken your position and possibly prevent you from passing any FinReg legislation?

You may have noticed that it seems like there is nothing Democrats can do that makes for good optics. This may be true. And if it is, it is a result of Democratic Senate electoral strategy. You see, current Democratic legislative strategy is inherently dictated by previous years Democratic electoral strategy. As we have seen, previous years Democratic electoral strategy has been to run "Moderate" Democrats for really tough Senate elections. Current Democratic Legislative Strategy is utterly bound by the previous year's Senate electoral strategy which resulted in 16 Moderate Democrats who oppose progressive legislation.

I have two main points as a result of all this analysis.

1) First of all, if you are a person who is unsatisfied with Democrats progress in addressing tough issues with progressive legislation, you would be a fool to blame the President or the House Democrats or anyone Senate Democrats other than the Republicans, the 16 Moderate Senate Democrats, and/or the state party Democrats who nominate these moderate Senate Democratic candidates. The Democratic leadership's legislative strategy is bound by previous years electoral strategy. Criticizing the Democrats who agree with us is stupid, provides fodder for the opposition, depresses the Democratic base (see: 2010 election), and ultimately results in Republican majorities and Republican rule. We should carefully consider the implications of Republican rule. I'll tell you one thing, though: Republicans are NOT interested in the same policy ideas that you and I are.

2) Second main point. I am an Idaho Democrat. I am not a Precinct Captain (If I could be, I would be), and I do not have a vote on the Central Committee. Eventually, I intend to attempt to garner a spot for myself on the IDP central committee. For now, I can only attempt to influence IDP as an outsider. The point is, this is where success for the progressive agenda starts. People like you and I have to find a way to work within the party infrastructure in our own state and influence the party to run candidates that actually push for progressive legislation. In Idaho, this starts small. Some of us have been advocating that Idaho look to Montana's Schweitzer model when nominating candidates. This is indeed a model wherein the candidate tacks to the center. However, the major difference between the Schweitzer model and the Minnick model, IMHO, is that while Schweitzer did tack to the center in many ways, he has still willing to push for a few progressive ideas that he thinks would appeal to Montana's Republican-dominated electorate. Minnick, otoh, did no such thing. As such, candidates like Minnick only reinforce the conservative high-moral frame, while candidates like Schweitzer do a pretty good job of introducing the progressive high-moral frame.

The truth of the matter is that, initially, a strategy like this will probably lead to less elected Democrats. This is true of the use of this strategy on a state-level and on a national-level. Maybe some other time we will talk about the implications of this strategy on state politics(pretty much the same implications, I think), but right now we are talking about national politics. The immediate disadvantage to the strategy proposed by myself and some others is the initial possibility of fewer elected Democrats and more elected Republicans. But let's look at the benefits. First of all, we would eliminate all of the optics problems mentioned above. Democrats would be free to push for true progressive legislation as a minority, and if they were elected on those ideas (as they were in 2008) they could push for true legislation as a majority, and actually enact such legislation. Democrats would not be forced to water down their own legislation/rhetoric and voters would not be forced to accept milquetoast change in lieu of the real change they voted for. I've said this before, but I'd much rather have fewer Democrats push for real progressive legislation in many areas as opposed to more Democrats pushing for milquetoast legislation (as well as failing to produce any progress on many issues). Real Democrats would be much more free to make real arguments that enforce a progressive high-moral frame. If you don't know what a high-moral frame is, read Lakoff, but I will tell you that the only way to actually change opinions on a political issue is through high-moral frames. The more real progressive legislation that Democrats are able to pass, the more enthused their base will become. As a result, more Democrats will be elected. If it's true that progressive legislation is good(and it is), then it is equally true that passing real progressive legislation will be popular.

We can see that the strategy of pushing "Moderate" Democrats into the Senate has failed on many levels. It didn't work for Minnick, it didn't work for the surprising number of Conservative and Blue Dog Democrats who lost their seat in this last election, and I highly doubt that it will work for McCaskill in her next election. The only two arguments for the "Moderate Democrats" Senate strategy are 1) that the majorities obtained as a result will allow Democrats to pass real legislation, and 2) that moderate Democrats will have an easier time retaining their seat in Republican-leaning districts. The past two years have proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that both of those arguments are completely faulty.

If voting against progressive legislation does not help a Democrat retain a seat in a Republican-leaning district, then what is the point of doing so? It is contrary to all of our goals and produces no benefits. We are much better off sticking to our guns when it comes to Senate electoral strategy.

More IDP inter-party analysis

This is just some on-the-fly commentary on George Prentice's recent interview with John Foster, so it's going to be short. And in bulletin-format. And in no particular order.

1. The good news seems to be that Mr. Foster has accepted a position as VP for a Seattle-based Public Affairs Company. Hopefully that means he won't be bothering us anymore. Just to be clear, I'm not saying he has no place within the party. I just don't think he does well at the top.

2. I have to point out the irony inherent in his obtaining such a lofty position within a Public Affairs company not even a month after essentially running one of the worst campaigns (mind you, a campaign is nothing BUT public affairs) in Idaho history. He made so many ridiculous missteps that I find it very ironic that he would move from this on to Public Affairs. Is it just me?

3. Okay, now I'm going to build some analysis around a couple of Foster quotations that I think are emblematic of some recent problems with the IDP.

4.

"I recognize that most of the people opining about what happened are doing it because they weren't in the middle of it and never will be. So they're inconsequential as a result."

Okay, so the thing about this is that it indicates a leadership problem. An important function of leadership is ability to listen to constructive criticism and accept it when it is fair. This aspect of leadership is 100X more important in party politics. If you are at the top you NEED to be able to listen to the folks at the bottom and incorporate their ideas into your strategy. In this case, we can see that Mr. Foster perceives those of us at the bottom as "inconsequential." That's a problem. Is there a "Foster-wing" of the IDP that agrees with him? Hard to say. A lack of inter-party communication makes it tough to gauge who thinks what. That's another problem. Lack of inter-party communication within the IDP. Some of you who know me may know that I publicly asked Mr. Foster to quit running dog-whistle ads before the election. He "de-friended" me on Facebook as a result. I realize that, as an Idaho Democrat, it was kind of controversial for me to criticize Foster's methods right before the election. Normally, I don't do that. But I did it for a reason this time. Foster was ignoring all the folks at the bottom who were sending private messages up the chain. I didn't want him to be able to lose this election and then say "there was no way we could have known." There was a way he could have known--because we told him. Loudly. And he ignored us. Anyway, back to my main point. It's 100X more important in party politics to be able to listen to the folks at the bottom. I'm not saying this just to castigate Foster. He's moving on to other things so that doesn't matter. I'm saying it because we need to somehow find a way to make sure the next IDP-ED is someone with the proper leadership qualities to actually run the IDP.

5.

We were ahead in all of our internal polling all the way up to the final days. Every single undecided voter broke against Walt. I'll make one comment about some of the post-election analysis: There seems to be an assumption that Democrats stayed home. The reality is that there are a lot fewer of them. The state has become a lot more red. More Democrats became independent and more independents became Republicans.

An "assumption"? Ummm, no Mr. Foster. An assumption is something you make when you have no evidence to back up your claim. However, Sisyphus, Interstics Blog, and Randy Stapilus have done a very effective job of showing that it is a FACT, not an assumption, that Democrats stayed home this election. And if there ARE fewer of them, it may be because of the fact that the IDP has moved Idaho Democrats so far to the right that (1) it doesn't really makes sense for many Idaho Democrats to support them, (2) they no longer offer a real choice to Idahoans, (3) they tarnish the brand. Nobody wants to vote for a party that hates itself, and (4) (and I think this is the most important one, personally) it strengthens the conservative high-moral frame in Idaho voters when we should be establishing the progressive high-moral frame in Idaho voters. How do you think folks like Schweitzer do so well in Montana? They stick to progressive high-moral frames and don't back down. If you don't understand what I'm talking about, please please PLEASE read George Lakoff. And not just this article I'm linking to. Read lots of Lakoff, until you are sure you understand the complicated subject-matter he is attempting to convey.

6.

I say this as a former executive director of the state Democratic Party. There is no Democratic Party in Idaho. A party is infrastructure. A party is operation and fundraising. There is simply no party.

No criticisms of Foster from me on this point. Just questions. Is this a fair assessment of IDP? If so, what can be done about it?

7.

The state is ruby-red Republican, and likely always will be. Any advice I would have to give would be to accept that reality and move on. Do not assume that you're going to get the state to change. It's Republican. It's conservative. Your strategy needs to be built around that reality.

Okay, this is just horrible advice from Foster. This guy was IDP-ED? No WONDER IDP has done so poorly recently. Look, running against our own policies tarnishes our brand. And that's just here in IDP. Electing rabid Blue Dogs tarnishes the brand nationally as well. Consider the fact that Democrats are about to be forced to extend the Bush tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy. They are being forced to do that because about 10-12 of the Senate Democrats are conservative Blue Dogs. Here's the thing: The American people don't care about Democratic Blue Dogs. They really don't give two shits. Most of the folks in the middle don't even realize the implications of this. All they know is that Democrats control the House AND the Senate right now and the Bush tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy are about to be extended. This tarnishes our national brand CONSIDERABLY! I'm not sure how to explain this in simpler terms, but I will say this: I'd rather have less-than-fifty Democratic Senators who are willing to push forth a progressive argument rather than fifty-plus Democratic Senators who can't do that because 10-12 of them disagree with the party platform. It makes NO sense whatsoever. If we can't put forth a Democratic argument we can't win elections. It's as simple as that.

The only other thing I'll say about this final Foster quote is to reiterate that we need to use the Schweitzer method of actually pushing good progressive arguments, thereby reinforcing progressive high-moral frames in Idaho voters. It's really the only way. Again, if you don't know what I'm talking about when I say high-moral frames please read Lakoff. Any Lakoff. It really doesn't matter.

8. Anyway, I wrote more than I meant to, but I feel better now. Thanks to Sisyphus, who has been at the forefront of this effort to formulate a strategy for IDP that makes sense.